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DEDISCURSIFICATION: A DISCOURSE-ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF DISCURSIVE PRODUCTION OF THE STATE OF WAR¹

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SUMMARY

This essay briefly presents the theory of dediscoursification as a theory of one of the major causes of war. Its key claim reads that discursive attitudes, such

¹ This essay is a summary statement of my book “Dediscoursification: how discursive attitudes cause wars” (2015); for earlier statements, see Pehar (2011b), (2013), and (2014a). Chapter 1 and parts of Chapter 4 were published at www.transconflict.com in the form of 12 individual sections from 29 January to 15 April 2016. I will use this footnote also to clarify two important issues that pertain to the theory of dediscoursification: 1. I noticed that some readers tend to interpret my argument as implying the proposition that dediscoursification is the key, or even the only important, cause of war. Such an interpretation is flawed. The only claim that the theory certainly and definitely implies is to the effect that dediscoursification is one of the major causes of war, hence, one of several equally important key causes. I pointed to the phenomenon because I think that, thus far, it has not been sufficiently theorized, or accounted for in clear theoretical terms. The theme of the extent to which the phenomenon of dediscoursification was recognized, or at least implicitly referred to, in the past scholarship is beyond the scope of this essay. 2. One reviewer described the theory of dediscoursification as a part of the Realist strand in International Relations (IR). I do not deny the reviewer’s right to categorize the theory in the way which he personally finds pertinent and relevant. Also, I do not underestimate the weight of the problems pertaining to the question of a proper categorization of the theories dealing with the specific topics relating to international relations in terms of the principal schools of thought in IR. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I understand the motives and reasons that may have motivated the reviewer’s categorization of the theory. However, an important part of the theory of dediscoursification cannot be presented in terms of Realism. In contrast to the reviewer’s, and Realist, understanding, I do not think that ‘legal interpretation’ is only a “sociological matter”, as the reviewer put it; most importantly, it is open to the supply of reasons that apply normatively even when ‘a society in question’ does not think so. Hence, most importantly, I myself tend to categorize my own work in the theory of dediscoursification as a part of critical theory, or critical rationalist theory (and “Republican” in terms of political theory in the sense given to the term by Pettit, Skinner, Viroli and Honohan), or simply a part of discourse-ethics applied

as lying, self-contradicting, and promise-breaking, ought to be theorized as causes directly contributory to the emergence of the state of war. The essay also explains the sense in which the theory implies a view of language as a generator of the virtual collective body. Thirdly, the essay draws on the Peloponnesian war as an empirical evidence in support of the dediscoursification theory and explains why the theory cannot be reconciled with the just war tradition of theorizing on war. Lastly, some ethical, epistemological, and political implications are spelled out to clarify here the theory's wider commitments to the extent possible.

KEY WORDS: dediscoursification; discourse ethics; causes of war; Peloponnesian war; just war theory; republican political theory

DEDISOURSIFICATION, METALINGUALITY, AND THE ETHICS OF THE LANGUAGE-MEDIATED COLLECTIVE BODY

The term 'dediscoursification' refers to the process marked by the following features: the negotiating parties tend to arrive, often on rational grounds, at the conclusion that their negotiating partners use language in the way that displays a crucial and definitive moral-discursive insufficiency: discourse tends to be taken as an indicator of a discursive attitude that is harmful both to language and to the language user when measured by some moral standards. More specifically, the negotiating partner is viewed as a liar, or as an incoherent language user, or as one who does not attend to the meanings of his or her interlocutor's sentences, or as one who with no regrets, or too easily, breaks his or her own promises. That is why at least one of the negotiating parties draws the conclusion that the medium of discourse is not a medium in which, or through which, the parties are in position to resolve a problem, or to negotiate an agreement, with the negotiating partner. In other words, dediscoursification is a process that guides one of the negotiating parties towards a rationally grounded conclusion that the use of discourse, in partnership with the said partner, could not pay off, that it is useless or necessarily futile. The thus concluding party has been

to International Relations (see Appendix); also, very importantly, I have a great sympathy for the so-called 'Rationalist' approach in International Relations, or the English school of IR (see Wight 1991 and Pehar 2011a); however, I definitely prefer doing business in International Relations at the middle level of abstraction or theorizing to trying to categorize my own business, or to trying to construct a grand and comprehensive theory of international politics à la Waltz; or, frankly, I prefer a sound work on specific issues and areas to the often futile attempt at finding a corresponding cluster of affiliates in terms of one of the grand theories of IR. Finally, here I would like to thank, first, two peer-reviewers for their valuable comment on the paper, and, secondly but not less importantly, Ana Matan, the editor of the journal, for her coordinating activity and wholehearted support.

dediscoursified, or forced discursively to accept the conclusion that there is no place for a discourse in partnership with the said partner.

The entire process unfolds through a number of distinct stages: the parties negotiate, or interact verbally or language-wise, and then the negotiations, or discourse, demonstrate that one of the parties lacks something that is of a crucial importance for the preservation of the institution of discourse; such a demonstration is supported by an additional corpus of evidence, and then, finally, one of the parties draws on some moral-discursive categories that disqualify both the discourse and the partner party. The process ends with a period of silence through which one can unmistakably recognize that the process of dediscoursification has indeed taken its toll. Immediately, we need to understand that the metalingual perspective must play a pivotal role in the process: it is a necessary perspective whenever one considers the quality of a discourse, or of another party's discursive attitude towards discourse. The key question one should pose in relation to the process is as follows: why do the aforementioned developments take place? Why are we inclined to cease communicating with the party we have designated as a 'liar', or as 'a shameless promise-breaker', or as 'an incoherent interlocutor'? Is there a mechanism by which one can explain the three kinds of the process as exemplifications of a common type? In other words, what features do the liar, the promise-breaker, and the incoherent user of language (and also one who pays no respect to the intended meanings of his or her interlocutor's propositions) share, which explains our conclusion on their discursive violations and immorality?

I believe that there is a mechanism that explains the process of dediscoursification and that also explains, or at least plausibly presents, one of the key roles or functions of language in human associations more generally. The key purpose of the use of language is to generate a virtual collective body: in other words, the key role of language, as an underlying institution to all societies, is to enable a mutual enrichment of the bodies of the individual users of language. What does this precisely mean? It means that, for instance, when passing information to one (on something that happened in the past or at some distant location), I serve to one as an 'additional pair of eyes' – literally I enable him or her to see some items that s/he could not see otherwise; I enrich his or her perceptual capacities and thus also enrich his or her individual body. Also, I serve the same, or highly similar, purpose when I simply pass one's proposition to another person: I thus enable the latter to hear and grasp some propositions that s/he would not be in position to hear or grasp otherwise; and I serve to the former as his or her voice, or, more precisely, as his or her 'mouth.' Again, we see that the use of language enables the enlargement, or enrichment, of one's perceptive, or expressive, bodily capacities. Hence, the users of language

figure to each other as the language-mediated generators of a collective body that brings equal benefits to all.²

Practical aspects of this function become visible especially in the condition when one community, or a group, needs to perform a single task – for instance, to organize the hunting, or defend the village from wild beasts, or organize any other job that depends on a cooperation of several group members. In such a context, it is of a critical importance for the community members to be able to rely on each other, or to know that the other members will perform a part of the task after which we can perform our own. Here we deal with, metaphorically speaking, the language-hand connection; language is used as a means by which one member of the community assures another that the former will serve to the latter as an 'additional pair of hands.' It is for such a purpose that mothers, for instance, teach their children the meanings of some words not only by connecting the words with some perceptual contents, but also by connecting them with some tasks that the children need to perform vis-à-vis the items to which the words typically refer. To the mothers, it is of an utmost importance that the children can perform some actions that assist the entire community, based on a previous agreement or on a predictable verbal frame of cooperation defining a sequence of actions that the individual agents will invest individually to achieve a common purpose. Again, we can say that language enables the community members to serve to each other as 'additional pairs of hands,' and that it does so by giving some, sometimes implicit, guarantee that the hands will do a part of the task on which some other hands depend, and which, therefore, the community members can reasonably expect and rely on. This is, I believe, the foundation to the practice of 'promise-making' as an important part of the institution of language, and it is the part that we, nearly without a further consideration, relate to the ethical character, or the moral values/principles, of a language-user.³

Now, why do I claim that the idea of language as a generator of the virtual collective body, or as a medium of the mutual enrichment of individual bodies, contains a pertinent explanatory frame for both the process of dediscoursification and the moral values involved in the use of language? First, we should notice that language cannot play the role of a generator of the said collective body without some substantive moral values, for instance, truthfulness, or reliability, or coherence, or an adherence to the inter-subjectively accepted meanings. For instance, I can serve to another person as an 'additional pair of eyes' only if I pass on true propositions

2 As Fiona Cowie (in Dessalles 2010a, 887) put it: "Two heads really are better than one, and the only way you can reliably link those heads is via language".

3 See also Tomasello (2008, 93).

to him or her. When I lie, or utter a deceptive utterance, I do not serve to him or her as 'a pair of eyes,' but as something that in fact clouds his or her view and distorts his or her perception. Similar considerations apply to the practice of promise-making. Once I give a promise to someone, then s/he expects from me to serve as his or her additional 'pair of hands.' However, if I break my promise, I inflict harm on his own hands, or the hands' controlling mechanisms, too – I betray those expectations on the basis of which his own hands were supposed, or expected, to draw on the part of the task performed by my own. Again we see that the moral matrix of discourse, the cluster of moral values that we naturally relate to the use of language, also secures the practice of creation of the collective body; the denial of such a matrix not only prevents the practice, but it makes our bodies weaker than they would be if we were not to internalize language as a common, ethically super-important institution that facilitates cooperation between the members of a community.⁴

Hence, language is an Ur-Institution. All other institutions supervene on it most directly. Therefore, it's no wonder that humans are first taught about the rules of acting within the Ur-Institution. It is virtually impossible to envisage a community aiming at a common task, or any other institution more narrowly defined, which could remain operative in the condition of an abuse of language in the moral sense. For instance, it is impossible to set in and preserve a ministerial department staffed with liars, breakers of promise, or incoherent users of language. Such a department will dissolve rapidly. Language is the medium in which basic elements of a collective body are created, and, as the human species, we have to rely on the medium to enable all other forms of cooperation. It is the medium in which an elementary trust is built together with an elementary form of transparency and reliability due to which humans can start committing to some additional forms of cooperation. This is why language primarily serves the 'phatic function,' as Roman Jakobson named it after a proposal by Bronislaw Malinowski; it is a function that secures the preservation of contact between the interlocutors as the users of a common code, or a discourse, a function that establishes a primary 'social bond.'⁵

Thus far, my story is presented as a kind of moral absolutism: there is a distinct world of moral-discursive values,⁶ which supports communication and prevents the effects of the dediscoursifying; in a stark contrast, there is also a world of violations of such values, one in which communi-

4 This theory fits well the research program of 'embodied cognition;' for a good example of an analysis as a part of this program, see Iacoboni (2008).

5 See Jakobson (1960) and Medina (2005, 8–12)

6 In my book I explain at some length why, and how, the values can be reduced to four fundamental types: 'meaning', 'truth', 'reason', and 'promise'.

cation is disrupted and beset by the effects of dediscoursification. Now, as thus presented, the story would be too simple and even misleading; it would not only fail to offer a comprehensive view of language and dediscoursification, it would also misrepresent the ways in which language actually operates and in which dediscoursification takes place in the real world. Jakobson refers to another function of language, which is triggered in some conditions and which he names as 'metalinguistic' (i.e. the 'metalingual' as already mentioned);⁷ this function can be elucidated only on the basis of a somewhat more complex view of the moral-discursive calculus that we perform both generally in relation to language and to the process of dediscoursification more specifically.

Our bodies are fallible. On some occasions we fail to produce a desired language-mediated effect due to many reasons: for instance, we inadvertently fail to give an accurate verbal depiction of an ambivalent, or fuzzy, image spotted by our eyes; or, occasionally our sentences gain an additional, yet unintended, layer of meaning due to a lack of appropriate syntactical markers in some contexts; or, sometimes we make a promise, but then, due to some unexpected and unwelcome occurrences, we realize that the fulfillment of the promise would entail some major harm either to us or the others. All such situations need to be clearly distinguished from the conditions in which we deliberately utter a lie, or show a deliberate lack of regard to the intended meanings of our interlocutor's propositions, or deliberately break our promises. Such situations occur inadvertently and non-typically, and whenever they occur, it is normal to expect both from the message sender and the message receiver to try to amend the situation. In contrast, the lying or the liar is a typical phenomenon – one who normally and frequently uses language in a certain way. Hence, on some occasions, the use of language is imperfect due to the natural flaws of the human species, but the users of language, including the key 'culprit,' view the occasion as amenable to perfection or improvement. However, on some other occasions, the use of language is both imperfect and non-improvable. If we designate our interlocutor as a 'liar,' or as a 'shameless promise breaker,' we mean to say that our interlocutor is a human being with which we cannot improve our language-mediated relationship without a comprehensive change in his character.

This gives us a solid basis on which we can elucidate the function Jakobson calls 'metalingual.' The function is typically triggered whenever the parties to a moral-discursive relationship realize that a repairable imperfection has occurred in the form of an inadvertent, and improvable, violation of the moral-discursive matrix of language. When an

7 See Jakobson, 'Metalanguage as a linguistic problem', in Jakobson (1985, 113–121).

unintended ambiguity, or error, occurs, or when a randomly erroneous or imprecise description is given, or when one has given a promise which is later viewed reasonably as non-implementable, the parties will typically focus on language itself to make an attempt to amend the moral-discursive inconvenience. Typically, they will attempt to clarify the ambiguity, or give a more precise description, or propose and explain, through a common discourse, the reasons for which the promise should remain unfulfilled, or for which it will have to be modified to an extent to accommodate the newly-emerged conditions. Hence, the metalingual function will be triggered to assist the key function of language as a collective body generator, to help recover the function in the condition when its performance seems disrupted or blocked. It is a function through which language helps itself, that is, a form of language which makes an attempt to pass unharmed through the period of a potential dediscoursification.

Additionally, one also needs to consider the fact that the so-called rhetorical modi of the language use result regularly in the triggering of the metalingual function. Occasionally, the users of language tend to weaken the role of one value of the moral-discursive matrix, e.g. 'truth,' or 'syntactical regularity' as a guarantee of the transparency of meaning, in order to strengthen, within a given context, the role of another value, e.g. 'reasons.' The other users of language will tolerate temporarily such a trade in values, because the individual intervention as practiced by the 'rhetorician' involves not a direct and deliberate violation of a moral-discursive value, but a product of a moral-discursive dilemma that requires a creative solution. For instance, we are temporarily prone to tolerate an ambiguity within a part of a peace agreement as such an ambiguity may lead to recovery of the dialogue between the parties regardless of the fact that, generally speaking, ambiguity is an instance of violation of the moral-discursive matrix of language. Hence, within a 'rhetorical' context, we tend to adopt a somewhat more complex moral-discursive calculus, a kind of trade in moral-discursive values, to enable ourselves to tolerate and improve upon an imperfect moral-discursive relationship, which naturally opens space to a major contribution by the metalingual function of language.

Hence, the metalingual function of language, as a necessary addition to the phatic function, serves primarily two purposes: either to perfect an imperfect condition, making it thus tolerable; or, as is the case with rhetorical figures and more creative uses of language, to demonstrate that, given all the factors that need to be added to our moral-discursive calculus, the condition needs no improving. However, the metalingual function may also demonstrate that the condition cannot be repaired or improved upon. The metalingual function may turn out to be unsuccessful in the sense of showing that 'the discussion of language by language' yields no result.

When the end-result of our use of the metalingual function is of such a character, then we witness the phenomenon of the true dediscoursification; it is then that we are inclined to designate our interlocutor as a liar, or as one who cares not about coherence, or as one who merely plays with word-meanings in an arbitrary way impenetrable to the others, or as an inconsiderate and remorseless breaker of promises who cannot bind himself by his own language. Concretely speaking, this now means that we need to pass through an extensive period of communication, through a number of moral-discursive interactions, with one to be able to describe one as a dediscoursifier, as one who, in a moral-discursive sense, is so flawed that s/he cannot cooperate with us in the construction of a shared collective body by the means of language.⁸ It is then that the termination of communication and a grave silence take place, and it is then that the path towards an outbreak of the armed conflict is fully open.

FROM DEDISCOURSIFICATION TO WAR – THUCYDIDES AND THE REAL WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Dediscoursification takes place in the real world of politics. There are many historical examples indicating that, prior to an outbreak of the armed conflict, the parties terminate their communication and fall into a silence motivated by a special experience of communication and of a discursive attitude. The theory of dediscoursification views such a kind of communicative failure, or disruption, as often rationally motivated – it is caused by a specific kind of communication that indicates a specific kind of discursive attitude as assumed by at least one of the parties to the conflict; it is a discursive attitude towards the moral-discursive matrix of language that makes us prone to designate one as, for instance, a liar, or as a promise-breaker, which is why we cease believing that a continued and discourse-mediated engagement with such a user of language should make sense;⁹ we form a reasonable belief that a further use of discourse, with the aim of finding a reasonable compromise in partnership with such a user of language, cannot pay off. In such a condition, silence is a predictable effect, and the two users of language are highly likely to cease viewing one another

8 This 'long path of communication' can be considerably shortened by the factor of culture, which means that dediscoursification may also be produced by cultural presuppositions or implications, not only by a series of direct or indirect discursive interactions with a political partner or adversary; for more detail on this, see the last section of this essay (Ethics of research).

9 As Williams (2002, 120) states, "If it matters to us that he is a liar, and we do not see this characteristic of his as just an eccentricity, as it is with some mythomaniacs, we are more likely to react by withdrawing relations and not having dealings with him".

as really human: one we cannot talk to is normally considered as one we cannot share a language with, hence also as a creature that is insufficiently human. Besides, since we are deprived of a proper communicative medium in relation to the party, all signals coming from them will henceforth be viewed as a potential threat, as an item by which they aim to manipulate, or deceive, or generally damage us.

This is what we see in Chamberlain's declaration of war again Germany. And we see the same response in Milošević's depiction of the Rambouillet draft agreement as a 'fraud.' Then we see this also in Nasser's comment, prior to the outbreak of the War of Attrition (1969–1970), that "language of the force of arms is the only language Israel understands."¹⁰ However, in some historical examples we can also clearly discern the connection between the moral-discursive matrix of language and the idea of language as a generator of the collective body. For instance, following the Dred Scott decision by Justice Taney, the leading abolitionist Douglass expressed a typical view of the critics of the decision at the dawn of the American Civil War. He stated that the passage of the verdict showed that the US Supreme Court closed its 'ear' against the African-American population who will in the future address the free part of the world that condemns slavery and is supportive of the African-American struggle (quote in Finkelman 1997, 175). This means that, in Douglass's eyes, the world is now clearly divided between the enemy and the ally, which is a demarcation line of the logic of war. In all the examples we see that the metalingual perspective is clearly expressed – one of the parties who have recently ceased communicating, and between whom a war would soon break out, characterizes in a certain way the use of discourse by the other party, and either suggests or directly claims that, due to such a characterization, in the future relationship between the two there will be no place for the use of discourse.¹¹ One of the parties suggests that the discourse of the other party is of such a character that the former must go silent in relation to the latter, which is a principal and a long-term silence; this then opens the door to the outbreak of war, i.e. to the use of armed force as a means of conflict resolution.

Due to a limitation of space, here I cannot go into the details of many historical examples. But, I will focus in more detail on a single case due to its historically privileged position. The case is a first war of which we have a relatively detailed and sufficiently reliable historical account: 'Pelopon-

10 For the sources, see Pehar (2013, 3)

11 The condition, in which some cultural matrices, or stereotypes, operate in the way which undermines the idea of discourse as a medium of the solving of shared social-political problems, poses no special obstacles to the theory of dediscoursification, for which see Pehar (2013, 13–14) and the concluding section of the essay.

nesian war' between Athens, with its allies, and Sparta, with its own, as it is presented in the History by Thucydides.¹²

The war between Athens and Sparta breaks out primarily due to a violation of a promise as it is contained in the text of the Thirty Year Peace (Treaty), which was supposed to regulate the relations between the two city-states. Today we don't possess the text of the peace treaty, but Thucydides's presentation gives us a pretty clear picture of its key provisions. Also, we ought to give consideration to the fact that the treaty was religiously sanctioned in the sense that the parties legitimized it by a sacred oath and a pledge to the god(s), which to the parties meant a communication with a transcendental sphere, one through which their own humanity was demonstrated in the form of their ritual-mediated commitment to a sacred word.

The peace treaty provisions included three that carried a special weight: first, both Athens and Sparta pledged that a state enlisted as an ally in one alliance could not switch sides and join the other alliance; secondly, non-allied states could join either of the alliances at a later date, in the treaty implementation period; thirdly, the two parties pledged that they would settle their future disagreements through a process of arbitration. The door towards the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war was opened by Sparta's view that Athens violated the second provision, to which Sparta itself responded by having violated the third. However, perhaps more importantly, prior to the outbreak of the war, perhaps for the first time in recorded history, the problem of interpretation of a peace treaty occurred: one party viewed a view of the other as a direct violation of the treaty, whereas the latter viewed it simply as a creative, but legitimate, interpretation of the same treaty. What did actually happen in the relationship between Sparta and Athens?

The complexities aggravated at a particular point in time when a war broke out between Corinth, an ally of Sparta, and Corcyra, a neutral city-state. Corcyra's naval fleet was extremely strong, which made it appealing to Athens. Now, in the middle of the war, Corcyra requested to join the Athenian alliance in accordance with the second provision of the Thirty Year Peace Treaty then in force. Both city-states, Corinth and Corcyra, presented their advice to Athens in the form of an elaborate legal interpretation of the treaty: according to a literal interpretation of the treaty, Athens enjoyed the right of enlisting Corcyra as a member of its alliance. However, did it enjoy the right according to a teleological interpretation of the same treaty? When you accept as an ally a non-allied state which is already at war with a member of the other alliance, does not this make

12 I draw on Thucydides (1952, Book I); a high-quality presentation of the war is offered also in Kagan (1995).

you a warring party too? Let us note that an answer to this question cannot be straightforwardly or easily given. However, Corinth claimed that the answer to the question was affirmative. Athenian Assembly was called into session to debate the issue, and the preliminary result was a draw – Athenians were in doubt as to the desired direction of the treaty interpretation; then the next day, by a tiny majority, Athenians decided to enlist Corcyra as their ally; however, Athenians emphasized that their alliance with Corcyra would be for defensive purposes only – it would be an *epimachia*, not a *symmachia*, as Thucydides reports.

Following the Athenian Assembly decision, at Sparta, Corinth starts lobbying against Athens: the main issue debated at Sparta was whether Athens has indeed violated the Thirty Year Peace by its alliance with Corcyra. By a strange coincidence, at Sparta we see some Athenian businessmen partaking in the debate and emphasizing that, under the treaty then in force, the disagreements between the two alliances should be settled by arbitration. Sparta will not make its own decision easily either. Spartan King Archidamus stated that it would not be fair to designate promptly a party as a warring enemy if, as it was the case, the party proposed a judicial settlement of the dispute. However, at Sparta a bellicose faction led by ephor Sthenelaides prevailed and, to the satisfaction of the Corinthian delegates, concluded that Athens has indeed broken the Thirty Year Peace, deserving thus the Spartan declaration of war, and that the Athenian offer of a dispute settlement by arbitration should be declined. In the following period, Pericles himself describes the Spartan attitude as a violation of the Thirty Year Peace Treaty, and cites it as proof of Spartan bellicosity. Pericles also added that this clearly indicated that Sparta was more inclined to resolve issues by war than by negotiations; again, we witness a metalin-gual perspective practiced prior to an outbreak of a war, and we witness a designation of a party as one who has been persistently inimical to the medium of discourse, exactly as predicted by the theory of dediscoursification. On the Spartan side, it is clear that they viewed their upcoming war with Athens as a defense of a sacred treaty document, and thus as a defense of the dignity of the human being before God's eyes: in fact, Spartans believed that they could bring Athens back to the realm in which a discourse has validity, and force it by an armed force to adhere strictly to the word of the sacred promise.

Most importantly, the theory of dediscoursification suggests that the war between Athens and Sparta could have been avoided; and it could have been avoided only if the parties have done their best to uphold the values of the moral-discursive matrix of language, which were in fact violated or dismissed.

What was a key problem in the Athenian attitude? It is clear that, at a point in time, their attitude was close to both Spartan and Corinthian view. The key flaw in their attitude was in the fact that, before their official endorsement of their own view, they have not done anything to make the view a common good to both Athens and Sparta. They have not, together with Spartans, discussed the reasons that could have, via an interpretation, transformed 'the contract with Corcyra on *epimachia*' into the rule of future conduct to all the parties involved. The problem was obviously of such gravity that it had to influence the relationship between the two alliances, but Athenians treated it narrowly, and wrongly, as their own. In other words, we see here a kind of moral-discursive disregard, or disrespect: one shared language (the Thirty Year Peace Treaty) is deemed an Athenian private language to which Athens had the right to attribute its own interpretation in accordance with its own interests. On the other hand, this made it nearly impossible for Sparta to accept the Athenian offer of arbitration: why should one believe that Athens would abide by arbitration, as proposed by Athens, when they have already, without consulting the partner party, prejudiced the character of the decision as it suited them only?

In the terms of the theory of dediscoursification, Athenians failed to respond to the Spartan objection in a right metalingual perspective: they decided not to focus on their own discursive attitude which they should have explored in light of the jointly accepted, or acceptable, reasons. They simply threw the ball back to the Spartan court, and refused to face the fact that their discursive attitude was indeed problematic. Hence, despite the need to assume a specific metalingual perspective in this context, Athenians did not assume it, which Spartans then rightfully interpreted as an outcome of a flawed and futile metalingual perspective, one which is not in a position to perfect the Athenian discourse or transform it into a properly acceptable, and thus shared, by Spartans too.

Hence, summarily, in reality we see a sequence of discursive performances that motivate the parties to leave the medium of discourse: 1. a problematic interpretation is endorsed unilaterally, without a joint assessment of the reasons from a metalingual perspective (Athens); 2. an indictment of a violation of the treaty provision (Sparta); 3. a response to the indictment which, in light of an interpretation that is already endorsed, seems insincere and deceptive (Athens); 4. a tight, or non-consensual, and the treaty-violating, Spartan decision to decline the offer of arbitration, which indicates a lack of readiness to discuss jointly the problem, which again involves the refusal to take a proper metalingual perspective; 5. another indictment of a violation of a treaty provision, which this time comes from the Athenian side who refuse to concede that responsibility, and culpability,

was partly on them too. Hence, in reality we see that, in their relationship, both sides have failed to perform some essential discursive sequences mainly of a metalingual nature, and those sequences could have, but have not, bridged the gaps opened in their mutual relationship through their own discursive acting: since the very start the parties needed a joint discussion and a joint scrutiny of their reasons including the reasons that should hold for all; they also needed a closer focus on the fact that neither of the two has concluded their deliberations by a reasonable consensual decision, but by tight majorities, and, of course, they needed to show a discourse-mediated awareness of the interests of the opposed coalition leader as well as of their own fallibility: for instance, while proposing the activation of the arbitration provision, Athens does not indicate that, as many Athenians indeed believed too, its own decision on the defensive alliance with Corcyra must be deemed problematic.

Perhaps most importantly, the dissonant voices from within both camps are silenced or ignored, and their discursive contribution is left unused; counterfactually, the dialogue between the Athenian opponents of the alliance with Corcyra, on the one hand, and the Spartan supporters of King Archidamus, including also all those aware of the need for a reasonable and joint argumentative exchange, on the other, was the only way to keep the relationship within the medium of discourse; in reality, in both camps the prevailing power was exerted by the promise breakers who also paradoxically believed that one can be forced by the means of war to abide by his or her own word, and who have thus managed to dediscoursify the other party and consequently cause a war.

It is interesting to note that, when Thucydides proposed his own, now famous, theoretical analysis of the causes of the Peloponnesian war, he ignored the factor of dediscoursification and nearly explicitly denied its significance. To remind, Thucydides proposed three types of the causes of war: one is 'fear' (*deos* in the classical Greek); the second is 'utility' (*ophelia*); and the third is 'honor/dignity' (*time*).¹³ As to the Peloponnesian war, closing the Book I he explicitly claims that Spartans were moved to wage it not by the argumentation of their allies on the issue of 'violations of the Thirty Year Peace treaty,' but by their fear of the growing power of Athens. In other words, Thucydides implied that the entire part of his narrative that deals with the peace treaty terms was dispensable and basically irrelevant. It is a part that presents mere excuses and rhetorical manipulations. In Thucydides's view, Sparta decided to wage a war against Athens prior to the conflict between Corinth and Corcyra; hence the conflict is, as Thucydides viewed, exploited by Sparta as a rhetorical

13 Thucydides (1952, I 88); see also Kagan (1995, 7–10).

excuse quasi-justifying its indictment against Athens, and thus quasi-justifying its decision to start the war which, in the Spartan heads, is already started. However, in light of such a view, how can we explain the conduct of King Archidamus or of the Athenian opponents of the Athenian defensive alliance with Corcyra? Secondly, and more importantly, why does Thucydides fail to pose the two fundamental questions: when humans do sense the need to satisfy the three aforementioned imperatives (of fear, utility, or honor), why do they prefer to apply force instead of negotiating, or the use of discourse, as a means of the satisfying of the imperatives? Secondly, should not we characterize our relationship with a promise breaker as one of a permanent state of war since the promise breaker is typically one with whom no peace agreement is possible? In such a sense, should not we pose the claim that war, as an application of a lethal force, is fully expected only in relation to one who cannot have the regard for our joint promises, which is why the notion of war should be inextricably linked to the notion of a '(non-repairable and remorseless) promise-breaking,' and thus also to the notions of discourse, i.e. discursive commitments and rights, or discursive attitudes?

As Thucydides does not pose such questions, he departs from the theory of dediscoursification at the very start of his theoretical analysis. However, his own historical account, when freed from his own theoretical vocabulary, imposes on us such questions. When we take his narrative literally as it is lived and practiced by the parties to the real political process, we cannot avoid posing seriously the question of promise-breaking. For instance, we should pose the question whether the Spartan accusation against Athens, due to the latter's alleged violation of a peace treaty, was justified. If it was, the question of 'fear', as framed by Thucydides, is immediately transformed into the question of discursive values, and also partly into the question of honor and dignity. If, however, the Spartan accusation was not justified, the question of 'fear' is transformed into the issue of a verbal and discursive falsity, or of an erroneous political/discursive representation of a political/discursive relationship; again, the notions of discourse and moral-discursive attitudes must be given the central role in our theoretical/analytical considerations. Of course, being serious and attentive readers of Thucydides's book, we will pose such questions, which will lead us towards the considerations typical of the theory of dediscoursification. Hence, we can directly conclude from this that, contrary to the first impressions, the distance between the very first, classical-Greek book on the causes of war, on the one hand, and the theory of dediscoursification, on the other, is very short indeed.

THE ISSUE OF MORAL ASSESSMENT: THE THEORY OF DEDISCOURSIFICATION VERSUS THE TRADITIONS OF THE JUST WAR THEORY

It goes without saying that the theory of dediscoursification is a moral discourse on the causes of war. It is a part of the so-called discourse-ethics applied to a specific form of communication in a specific context. It is also obvious that the theory of dediscoursification involves a moral assessment of the agents of international politics in their role of communicators who, through their patterns of communication (that is, their moral-discursive attitude toward the moral-discursive matrix of language as evinced through an extensive period of time), contribute, or not, to the outbreaks of the armed conflict. Those agents contribute to the outbreaks of war primarily by generating in other agents a silence as a logical effect of the latter's conclusion that they are not in position to generate the collective body through the use of discourse in the partnership with the former. Furthermore, it is also obvious that such a view implies a clear attribution of a moral-discursive, and also political, responsibility.

However, the most important part is in the fact that, in a temporal sense, the theory of dediscoursification situates the key problem pertaining to the armed conflict in a much earlier period than is the period of the pulling of the trigger. The key problem is not in the act of the trigger pulling, but in the silence that makes the act highly likely. This is where the theory of dediscoursification roughly coincides with both Hobbes's and Clausewitz's theory of war as a continuation of political commerce by other means; in both theories, the causes of war are situated in the condition that precedes the outbreaks of the armed conflict. (Hobbes 1994, 76; Clausewitz 1997, 357–8) However, the theory of dediscoursification also explains why the outbreak of war implies a terrible and shameful fall of human nature, a regression into the state of barbarity, that is, a human relationship that should not be taking place between humans as creatures endowed with the capacity of reasonable discoursing. It is clear why this is, in a moral sense, a super-problematic kind of relationship, but we need to note that the morally problematic condition is humanly produced by a problematic attitude to the moral elements of the use of discourse, that is, by a moral flaw of some individuals as the users of language.

One of the most important consequences of the dediscoursification theory reads that we cannot envisage a just war at all. In light of the theory, the waging of war is simply a flawed way of responding to some shared problems; the war is an attempt to prove the superiority of some reasons in a wrong medium, through an existential struggle for life or death, i.e. through annihilation of the party who advocates or offers the reasons irreconcilable with ours. When we view the armed conflict through the lens

of the cessation of communication, which in itself involves a sufficient amount of evil and injustice, such a conflict may defend or attack a proponent of some reasons, but the proponent may stand for both inter-subjectively flawed and inter-subjectively sound reasons. Nothing in the outcome of the war, which may favor one or the other party, guarantees that the inter-subjectively sound reasons will prevail in the right way, because no war can prove the inter-subjective soundness of reasons in the right way. To one who is a victim of dediscoursification, the only purpose of the war may consist in the following: to preserve the relationship as it was immediately prior to the outbreak of war, i.e. to maintain the initial stalemate, and then to recover the communication as swiftly as possible and exit the condition of silence, which is the key indicator of the beginning of the state of war. Hence, from the perspective of the use of discourse which upholds the moral-discursive matrix, a just war is impossible because no war can produce a just result; of course, one may decide to define arbitrarily the pre-fight stalemate as a just condition, but, under inter-subjective criteria, such a condition was not just: it is a condition preceded and made possible by an abuse of the moral values of discourse, i.e. by a morally-discursively problematic and destructive conduct of at least one party to the armed conflict.

We should emphasize another matter that is relevant in this context: the dediscoursified party may be one who has launched the first attack; in other words, the party who is not responsible for the cessation of communication may be the first to launch a grenade against the enemy due to a plethora of causes. In such a sense, measured exclusively by the conduct at the given moment, such a party should be deemed unjust, whereas the opposed, and the dediscoursifying, party should be deemed just because it 'only' defends itself against the 'aggression.' However, this consequence is highly counter-intuitive. The dediscoursified party does not become suddenly unjust by having launched the first attack, and the dediscoursifying party does not become suddenly just by having defended itself against the aggression. In the view as proposed by the theory of dediscoursification, there is no place for the notion of a direct aggressor in the sense of a party who decides to launch the first attack. However, there is a place for the notion of an unjust party as one who carries the key responsibility for the cessation of communication. Again, we may decide to define the party arbitrarily as an aggressor; however, it is more prudent if we do not because the moral matrix of discourse was not violated by a direct, external aggression against a party; it was violated through a more subtle mechanism. Additionally, it is clear that neither party must be considered as exclusively responsible for the outbreak of a lethal violence though one may be considered as exclusively responsible for the state of war; according

to the theory of dediscoursification, the parties start experiencing the state of war when the silence, as posited by the theory, falls upon them; in the condition defined by the silence, violence may break out, as it often does, due to a super-pessimistic reading of specific intentions of the other party, which is highly likely in such a condition; and, it is highly likely because it is an expected effect of de-humanization which goes hand-in-hand with dediscoursification.

The preceding paragraphs lead us directly to another kind of moral discourse on the origins and causes of wars. It is the tradition of the 'just war theory.'¹⁴ This is a tradition that is, in a historical sense, relatively old, but we will see that it may be better to speak about 'traditions' since, on some important issues, the advocates of the theory take starkly different, occasionally even irreconcilable, views. For a start, it is important to emphasize that a rudimentary form of the theory can be found in St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. The theory is presented in the form of a response to the following question: when one makes a decision to wage war, what moral criteria ought to be met for the war to be describable as just? In other words, the theory has been formulated for those who already evince an inclination to use the armed force, but who also need some limitations, or constraints, to be able to designate their use of the force as moral or legitimate. In such a sense, the proponents of the theory have formulated some criteria that can be separated in three categories: *ius ad bellum* (or, moral/legal considerations prior to the war), *ius in bello* (or, moral/legal considerations during the war), and *ius post bellum* (or, moral/legal considerations after the war). Generally, and for obvious reasons, the weightiest part of the theory is located in *ius ad bellum*.

Aquinas cited the three initial criteria of the *ius ad bellum* as follows: *auctoritas* (or, the right authority), *causa iusta* (or, the right aim), and *intentio recta* (or, the right intention). To those, the just war theorists added three further criteria as follows: the criterion of the probability of success; the criterion of proportionality in the sense that the amount of good produced by the war must outweigh the amount of evil or harm produced; and finally, the criterion of 'ultima ratio',¹⁵ which reads that a war may be waged only after some alternative means of the promotion of one's just cause, including primarily the means of diplomacy and negotiation, had been exhausted.

But, the proponents of the just war theory view such criteria in very different perspectives. Hence, as mentioned, it is more pertinent to talk

¹⁴ For summary presentations of the tradition, see Fisher (2011, 64–84), Orend (2008), and Reichberg (2008).

¹⁵ 'Ultima ratio' in the Latin language means 'the ultimate reason'. A common, but imprecise, English equivalent is 'a last resort'.

about the traditions of the just war theory than about a single tradition, or a coherent theoretical doctrine. There is no such a thing as a unified, coherent, and paradigmatic theory of just war. This can be easily demonstrated through an analysis of the 'ultima ratio' criterion. First, does the criterion involve a demand that the decision for a war be made only after all alternative paths towards a just aim had been exhausted, or only a demand that the decision for a war be made by giving consideration to the alternative paths, and comparing those with the movement towards the just aim by the means of the armed force? In other words, does the 'ultima ratio' criterion involve a normative preference of a peaceful, discursive solution of the conflict over the conflict settlements by the means of war? Secondly, how should we precisely interpret the concept of 'alternative means of the achievement of a just cause or aim'? Does the concept include only negotiations, i.e. the use of discourse, or does it also include the means of a non-discursive pressure, such as economic sanctions?

The just war theorists widely differ in the models they offer as a response to the aforementioned questions. For instance, O'Brien (2009, 431) is inclined to treat the criterion under a wide and normative interpretation; to him, the criterion should serve to maximize the probability of a peaceful and negotiated solution of a conflict, hence to avoid war. However, Johnson assumes a different view: he claims that nothing in the criterion suggests, or implies, the preference of a peaceful conflict resolution over a violent solution: the outcomes are determined strictly by a utilitarian calculus – provided that negotiations will be judged as uncertain and expensive, the path of the armed conflict ought to be preferred. (Johnson 2006, 184)

Some individual authors within this tradition also, on different occasions, assume irreconcilable successive interpretations of the 'ultima ratio' criterion. For instance, prior to the war in Kuwait (The Gulf War), Walzer has dismissed the criterion because, in his view, it implied a metaphysical notion of 'lastness'. (Walzer 2004, 88) However, at the time of the Iraqi 2003 war, he proposed that the criterion should be applied, emphasizing that it serves ultimately as a warning against the dangers of war, or the war's fundamentally unpredictable nature; hence, the criterion really implies that one should try all alternative means of problem-solving before one makes a decision to rely on the means of the armed force. (Walzer 2004, 155) It seems, however, that Walzer has conveniently forgotten about this implication at the time of the Gulf War. This is another proof that, by 'the just war theory,' the just war theorists mean very different things, and that, as a part of the same corpus of theory, the said criteria are often subject to controversial, contradictory, or variable, interpretations.

More importantly, those criteria are also subject to a political abuse and manipulation. Prior to the NATO 'Allied Force' action, in 1999, Tony Blair applied the criteria of the just war theory, and claimed that the USA with its allies has done everything to resolve the conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians by peaceful means, including primarily the Rambouillet and Paris peace talks. (Ignatieff 2000, 72–3) However, those who have learned about the key contours of the process know that the American diplomats negotiated with the Serbian side in a mode that was supposed to motivate the side to decline the drafts, not to accept them, so that the USA can get an excuse for the start of the NATO action. But, note now that this example also shows that the proposition, that one has attempted to resolve a conflict by the method of peaceful negotiating under the 'ultima ratio' criterion, may be false or deceptive; it may pertain, for instance, only to formal-procedural aspects of a diplomatic effort. It is possible for one to negotiate, prior to an outbreak of war, in the way that prevents a peaceful and negotiated solution. Then, following the failure of the talks, one makes a decision to wage war. The most important consequence of this example reads as follows: the 'ultima ratio' criterion may be satisfied in a purely formal way without being satisfied in reality;¹⁶ the aspect that distinguishes the real application of the criterion from a formal one is in the nature of the discursive attitude assumed by the negotiators: they ought to use language in the way that does not result in elimination of discourse itself as a key medium of the relationship between some political agents, diplomatic representatives, negotiators, and similar.

This, however, brings us back to the theory of dediscoursification. From the standpoint of the theory, there cannot be a logical or rational transition from the condition of a non-self-destructive, or constructive, use of discourse to the condition of an armed force application; and from the same standpoint, the transition from the state of being dediscoursified to an armed force application can in no way improve upon, or confirm, the morality/legality of the claims on behalf of which a war is fought. This means that, according to the theory of dediscoursification, the 'ultima ratio' criterion cannot be used rationally in the way in which a majority of the just war theorists uses it. It is impossible for one to arrive at the point at which one can pose the following claim: "I tried and exhausted all the peaceful and diplomatic options – now, the only remaining option is to try to achieve the just cause through the use of armed force."

Consequently, the 'ultima ratio' criterion¹⁷ cannot be satisfied in reasonable terms. This thesis is also confirmed formally by James Fearon (1995,

¹⁶ See also Singer (2004, 146–151)

¹⁷ I thank one reviewer for reminding me of the following: the 'Sun King,' Louis the XIV (1638–1715), ordered the Latin phrase 'ultima ratio regum' (the kings' ultimate reason) to be

386–388): he demonstrates that the minimally rational actors must always prefer a large number of negotiated options to the option of war; he also demonstrates (1995, 388–389) that the conditions in which his demonstration applies are sufficiently realistic (for instance, the actors are taken as either risk-adverse or risk-neutral, not risk-friendly). From the angle of the theory of dediscoursification, this is an expected consequence. Have in mind that the theory claims that, in order to draw the inference that there is no space left for discourse in your relationship with your negotiating partner, you need to be dediscoursified; this, however, means that someone must have already violated the moral-discursive matrix of language; furthermore, this means that a legitimate structure must have been violated in the course of the negotiating and prior to an armed conflict, which prevents us from posing reasonably the claim that 'all the peaceful and diplomatic options had already been exhausted in reality.' Finally, this means that an armed conflict cannot correct such illegitimacy because it is a discursive kind of illegitimacy, which can be corrected or righted only by discursive means. Summarily, the 'ultima ratio' criterion cannot be satisfied; hence, it cannot be used as a reasoned basis of a moral assessment in support of a decision for a war. Therefore, whenever a theorist of just war claims otherwise, s/he, consciously or not, produces the state of war by discursive means and acts dediscoursifyingly on those s/he communicates with.

ETHICS OF RESEARCH

Theory of dediscoursification is part of a discourse-ethics. Such ethics is shared naturally by the researchers, their subjects of research, and their readers or the research consumers. All three groups are mutually connected through language, and all languages are endowed with the vocabulary, propositions, and practices that give us the means to characterize the moral-discursive aspects of the use of language: with the words such as 'truth,' 'promise,' 'untrue,' 'compatible,' 'right,' 'precise,' 'misdirected,' 'reason-supported,' and similar; with the practices such as the correcting of those who internalize language, the asking of questions to assess the capacity of formation of the conceptual implications and relationships generally, the right kind of responding to the cases of moral disagreement, or the emulating of those who give promises, and similar; and also with the phrases and operators indicating that the speaker has assumed a metalin-

inscribed on his cannons; however, one should here immediately note that the mere inscription of the phrase did not actually transform the cannons into reasons; and that the attempt by the 'Sun King' to present cannons as 'reasons' by an inscription should be taken as perhaps only ironic, or, if intended seriously, as infantile and thus ultimately self-defeating.

gual perspective, such as 'word', 'sentence', 'meaning', and similar. There is no doubt that this makes the ethics of research in the theory of dediscoursification potentially universal and principally open to a contribution by all mature users of language.

However, the theory of dediscoursification also deals with a situated discourse. It is a discourse as practiced within specific contexts by individual users of language dealing with specific problems along specific historical trajectories; those users attempt to give a specific response to specific moral dilemmas within a real historical context. This should not concern the researchers of this kind too much, because it simply means that the theory of dediscoursification needs to involve an exhaustive and empirically reliable historical investigation, which needs to be accessible to the researcher, to his or her subjects of research, and to the wider audience as well. No special distance, or remoteness, either cognitive or moral or historical, should follow from the fact that the theory of dediscoursification deals with a situated discourse that is practiced within a concrete historical context.

In fact, one of the key ethical effects of the theory of dediscoursification pertains to the theory's ability to look both to the past and to the future; it may serve as a history lesson, but also as a source of warnings about the future developments. For instance, the vocabulary and explanatory mechanisms of the theory enable us to explain the sense in which a past war is continued in the present time, hence, the sense in which a war, which formally ended with an official peace treaty, continues today through the parties' attitude to the text of the treaty, e.g. as a war of interpretations, or through an arbitrary imposition of interpretations, or through arbitrary changes in attitude that indicate dishonesty and deceptiveness (Pehar 2014a). The theory enables us to explain the sense in which some contemporary agents of international politics produce discursively the state of war by dediscoursifying some other agents. In other words, the theory of dediscoursification obviously contains a prospective ethics which, by explaining and criticizing the discursive direction in which some agents move, can help us to avoid wars or at least prepare us for the period of an increased turbulence in international relations.

As to the ethics of research on which the theory of dediscoursification implicitly relies, I should emphasize two more things. First, the theory subscribes to the principle of methodological individualism. The insufficiently exhaustive amount of historical evidence in Thucydides perhaps prevents us from clearly recognizing the importance of this point. However, it is generally clear that, when we criticize a use of discourse, we have to deal with a specific individual user of language. We cannot criticize a way in which an entire group uses a discourse except in a derived sense of

adhering to some discursive products by some individuals. Whenever we reveal a lie, or another abuse of language, we need to cite somebody, and one we cite is one who carries a full responsibility for the lie. Whenever we reveal a case of promise-breaking, we need to refer to the words and actions of one who has stated something and acted in a way, which enables us to pose a reliable claim concerning his or her promise-breaking.

Hence, regardless of the part of the theory of dediscoursification which draws on the notion of language as a generator of the collective body, the theory commits us strictly to a moral individualism. This furthermore means that, within the confines of the theory, the attribution of responsibility is a pretty clear and straightforward affair. We cannot hold one responsible for a violation of the moral-discursive matrix of language without being able to state how, in what conditions, and by whom the deed was done. As to collective agents, such as nations, religious groups or ethnic communities, we should be able to attribute responsibility to them indirectly, in the sense of the bodies that, either explicitly by voting or implicitly by not opposing, support some individuals to whom the responsibility for dediscoursification is directly attributable.

The principle of methodological individualism is important for another reason: the phenomenon of dediscoursification may also be culturally produced or inherited, not only brought about through a series of discursive interactions between specific individuals. One such culturally-produced kind of dediscoursification is pertinently illustrated by the following excerpt from the movie 'Kingdom of Heaven' (2005) directed by Ridley Scott.

Immediately before the scene of the first armed duel in woods, when Godfrey's crew are ambushed because they refused to hand in Godfrey's son Balian to the officers of the lord bishop, a dialogue involving the bishop's sheriff, Balian himself, and Godfrey's squire (played by a Fin Jouko Ahola), takes place as follows:

"SHERIFF: You have with you a man, Balian, who killed a priest. I'm charged by the lord bishop to bring him back. BALIAN: What he says is true. They have the right to take me. SQUIRE ('ODO'): I say he is innocent of the charge. If you say he's guilty, then we'll fight. God will decide the truth of it. HOSPITALER [with a smile]: My German friend [the squire] is a close student of the law."¹⁸

This is a simple dialogue, but it says a lot about the beginnings of an armed conflict. First, we see that here disagreement is taken as an immediate cause of the use of armed force. In other words, the road from discourse to a use of force is here extremely short. The opposed parties

18 The script is by William Monahan, and was available at <http://www.ec.it-hiroshima.ac.jp/sakemi/movies/Heaven.pdf> (Accessed July 28, 2015).

do not arrive at a conscious conclusion that their disagreement cannot be settled by peaceful means, but take it a priori and unreflectively as valid. Also, the moral matrix of discourse seems not to have been tried at all. Why, then, do the parties so swiftly take their arms against each other? Is the squire an advocate of Hobbes's theory according to which disagreements should immediately produce the state of nature, or war, when an arbiter, a sovereign person or the Leviathan, is lacking?

In fact, the story is more complicated than that; one needs to consider immediately that here one deals with the 12th century crusaders. The factor that generates dediscoursification in this case is not placed directly, or fully, in discourse as used by the parties to the conflict; it is a mechanism which, after being encoded into the religious or philosophical folklore of the age, is imposed, and reinforced, tacitly by cultural transmission. In other words, in this case, discourse immediately opens the door to a use of force because discourse itself is interpreted culturally in a specific, and flawed, way, and because the distinction between discourse and force is relativized by a special mechanism of cultural and religious encoding.

Most importantly, the squire Odo immediately invokes the notion of God, which allows him to interpret the use of force in a peculiar way: as a process that leads to confirmation of God's word or God's will. Dispute in this context is not viewed primarily as a condition produced by the human discourse, but as a call to reveal another discourse, divine one, which is vastly superior to the human. Hence, in Odo's world, one should say that the distinction between the human word and the sword is biased in favour of the latter by its assumed capacity to contribute more directly than the former to God's revelation of his own word. Or, in Odo's world, which is not our own, modern world, the sword is, perhaps paradoxically, placed closer than the human word to God's word. In such a sense, the force is here taken as a worthy investment into a process that is both unpredictable to the human being and guided by the divine hand. It is through the victory of one of the parties that God passes his judgment on the dispute – one who won, and survived, is both one who God chose and one who was "right" according to the semantics of the divine discourse. Therefore, summarily speaking, Odo expresses a priori preference of the force over the language of human communication/negotiation for two pseudo-reasons: 1. He views the force as a commencement of a superior, divine discourse; and 2. he views the outcome of the application of force as the ultimate word, and closure, of such a discourse, or "God's decision on the truth," as he explicitly put it.

Hence, Odo, a part of 'crusader' narrative, is also a slave to a form of militarized culture, a military evangelism of fear, which is inherited and transmitted by a specific blending of the force of swords with a view of

Deity as one showing through the human battles but not through the human words. Or, Odo is a part of the culture that dediscoursifies and dehumanizes the human discourse-users by deifying their swords and by interpreting those swords as the only paths to the revelation of divine words.

Therefore, the key lesson of the narrative, and the scene, can be summarized easily: occasionally, the process of dediscoursification involves not only the parties that experience and interact directly with each other through the process of communication; sometimes it may also involve some wider, culturally propagated narratives in which discourses by the parties are tacitly embedded. This means that, at least occasionally, such wider narratives inherited as the parts of a culture, too, should be considered and assessed in accordance with the key parameters of the moral-discursive matrix of language. However, equally importantly, the principle of methodological individualism implies that such cultural factors, or narrative frames, are always inherited and further transmitted by specific individuals, or groups in the mundane sense of associations composed of individuals. For instance, the 12th century 'crusader' culture can be inherited, internalized, and further propagated, and thus sustained, only by Odo and the likes of Odo.¹⁹

Secondly, while this may be less visible upon a first glance, the theory of dediscoursification is very concerned, in an ethical sense, with the exercise of power as domination in the precise sense given to the concept by Philip Pettit and the contemporary republican political theory.²⁰ Domination is 'the capacity to interfere arbitrarily with the choices of others,' which is fully visible in the relationship between the master and the slave. Such an exercise of power as domination can take many forms, such as a selective and arbitrary, and thus unjustified, application of law, or an imposition of unjust laws, or an imposition of an arbitrary interpretation through the venue of supreme/constitutional courts. It is common to all such forms that they, as Pettit explained, embody some discourse-unfriendly influences; all of them primarily dediscoursify their victims and force them to live in a condition in which a discourse with the powerful figure cannot pay off.

In a drama by Euripides, one of the heroes explains the condition of slavery as a state in which one cannot practice *parrhesia*, which is the freedom of full and unimpeded discursive disclosure of one's thoughts; it is a state in which one has to bear the incompetence, or the folly, of the

19 However, as to a radically relativist culture's propensity to 'bullshitting', which is at least in effect similar to 'lying/deceiving', see Brandenburg (2006)

20 See Pettit (1999), (2001) and (2004), and Bobbio, Viroli (2003).

powerful.²¹ It is here that we can most clearly discern that the master-slave relationship is primarily one of a discursive nature, and that the master is one who dediscoursifies the slave and deprives the latter of his, or her, status of a human being who can freely participate in an open and reasonable discourse. In other words, whenever we apply the theory of dediscoursification, we are implicitly committed to the disclosing of the relationship of domination, and we unambiguously explain the sense in which one individual relates to another in the modus of the master-slave relationship. We also explain why such a relationship is not viable in the long run, why it should not hold between the mature human beings, and also why humans cannot avoid rebelling against such a relationship, sometimes even in the form of an armed rebellion. Slave is typically one whose lips are closed, one who is forced to exist in the condition of silence and dediscoursification, and the theory of dediscoursification gives a very precise description of the reasons why, in such a condition, an outbreak of armed conflict is nearly a certainty.

Hence, the theory of dediscoursification involves an ethics which refuses to accept the silence, which is a condition very much favored by dictators, tyrants, and autocrats, and which elucidates the origins of the condition and attributes responsibility to those truly responsible. In this sense, the ethics to which the theory of dediscoursification is committed is also a liberalizing ethics, one which draws on the republican notion of liberty and involves to a great extent the practicing of civic and discursive virtues to which the educated, brave, and responsible citizenry is a prerequisite.

Lastly, there is another aspect which puts the theory of dediscoursification in an antagonistic position to all the forms of domination as an arbitrary exercise of power: the theory is a strong part of discourse-ethics, which firmly supports the idea of the moral-discursive matrix on which all sustainable forms of discourse must rely. However, have in mind that a single, unique embodiment of such a matrix cannot be represented; there is no individual, or a group, which in secure and perfect terms exemplifies, or embodies, a true, coherent, clear, and reliable discourse. Hence, in this regard, nobody should enjoy some a priori rights: a true, clear, and reliable discourse is proved by its practicing, which does not come with an a priori guarantee; also, such a discourse is practiced only on the basis of one's ability to recognize, and correct, one's own errors and remain open to free exchange of reasons in the condition of moral-discursive dilemmas; such dilemmas can be resolved only through the soundest reasons gathered through a non-discriminatory collective deliberation. This, then,

21 The hero is Polynices from 'Phoenician Women' (see Euripides 1913, lines 391–5).

is the right way of preventing, or countering, domination as a condition discursively created by those who deem themselves infallible or protected from all forms of criticism. It seems that, by now, nobody has succeeded to suppress fully the freedom of critical thought or to silence and dediscoursify all his or her fellow humans. The human species has experienced many wars, and those who have dediscoursified their fellow humans gained nothing but the wars. I think that now, more than ever, is the right time to draw a proper lesson from the simple fact.

APPENDIX (ON DISCOURSE-ETHICS)

Discourse-ethics as advocated in this essay does not fully coincide with the version advocated by Jürgen Habermas or Karl-Otto Apel (for an introductory collection of texts, see Benhabib, Dallmayr 1990). This is also important for the understanding of the relatively recent debate initiated by Chantal Mouffe who, based on a Schmittean conception of politics and Ernesto Laclau's reading of Derrida, rejects all Universalist and Enlightenment-inspired views of politics including those of Habermas and Rawls (see Mouffe 1993, 9–22, and Mouffe 2000, 80–107).

I refer to all those themes and issues here in a sweeping mode; however, it is, I think, pertinent to clarify here my attitude to the key tenets, figures, and problems of discourse-ethics to the extent possible.

First of all, as I already emphasized in the last section of the essay, my discourse-ethical analysis focuses primarily on the situated patterns of discourse, hence should not be readily accused of a universalist perspective (for a few examples, see Pehar 2016). Closely related to this, in my version, which here does not come through fully, there is an ample room for the notion of 'moral-discursive' dilemmas that reflect our mundane experience of moral dilemmas in the realm of ethics, and that, most importantly, cannot be resolved by a reference to the moral principles only. For instance, the rhetorical aspects of discourse (such as metaphor, allegory, ambiguity, allusion, irony, and similar) cannot be theorized at all without some reference to the moral-discursive dilemmas, and to a peculiar trade between discursive values that such aspects normally involve. Habermas's approach is irreconcilable to this: he tends to legislate rhetorical figures out of existence (see Pehar 2011a, 212–233).

Thirdly, generally I agree with Mathias Kettner, Apel's student, who points out that discourse-ethics, one in the form proposed primarily by Apel, requires two critical amendments: first, it should be made more realistic and, secondly, more responsive to problematic situations, those that come under the heading of 'discursive violations' (Kettner 2006 and 2009, and Kettner in private communication in May 2014). Also, dediscoursification probably supplies the crucial evidence in support of the thesis that

discourse-ethics is not a purely normative endeavour divorced from the realities of daily life; hence, in terms of both empirical presuppositions and empirical consequences, discourse-ethics is very weighty indeed. To the extent that Apel and Habermas generated the impression that, empirically, it is not so weighty, the version of discourse-ethics as proposed in this essay should be positioned fully outside their frame of theorizing.

Fourthly, in contrast to both Habermas and Apel, my version of discourse-ethics is couched not only in the vocabulary of moral principles or rules, but also in the vocabulary of moral values that, in my view, play a more fundamental role than principles/rules; I think that any viable, and realistic, version of discourse-ethics needs to be made responsive to the facts of 'creative, yet sufficiently reasonable reinterpretation of rules.' For instance, we need to acknowledge the fact that, in some conditions, promises need to be violated, or suspended or delayed, to implement another moral value that, at the exact time of promise-giving, was not deemed so prominent. Such discursive phenomena cannot be explained in the language of moral rules/principles only.

Fifthly, the reader of this essay needs to be aware of the fact that the tradition of discourse-ethics is actually very old, very venerable, and irreducible to the version propagated in the late 20th century by two, or three, German-speaking philosophers (if we decide to add Robert Alexy to Habermas and Apel, and there is no sound reason why we should not). One of my favourite figures is Isocrates, Plato's contemporary, who produced one of the best known eulogies to 'Logos,' the human capacity to use and share a reasonable kind of discourse as a basis of human cooperation, legislation, science, and technology (see Isocrates 1929 and Vickers 1989, 149–159). Of course, many more should be added to Isocrates; for instance, Aristiades and many writers in the Greek-Roman classical antiquity presented and analyzed also in Foucault's lectures on the 'truth-based' practices of the care of Self such as *parrhēsia* (at College de France 1980/81 and Berkeley 1983, for which see Foucault 2001 and 2005). As to the modern advocates, in my opinion, Bok (1999), Williams (2002), Orwell (1961) as well as Arendt (1972), and, of course, Pettit (2004), should too be listed as typical representatives of the discourse-ethical perspective, one to which I am personally much more indebted than to Habermas²² or Apel.

Sixthly, and lastly, as to my view of Mouffe's "agonistic (pluralist) politics" specifically, I am afraid I don't have much positive to say and, in this, I think that all discourse-ethicists, including Habermas and Apel, would

22 One should also have in mind that I strongly disagree with Habermas's public support for the NATO 'Allied Force' action of bombing both military and civilian targets in Serbia to force the country representatives to accept US terms of settlement for the conflict in Kosovo(a); for an eloquent critique of Habermas in this regard, see Rho'Dess (2010).

agree with me despite the aforementioned family argument. In fact, here is one argument against Mouffe's basic frame of theorizing I proposed a few years ago: "Mouffe claims that democracy is formed fundamentally by two things: the replacement of the notion of 'political enemy' with the notion of a legitimate political adversary; and secondly, a common symbolic/institutional frame that is shared by political adversaries and that places limits on [but never fully resolves; addition in 2017] the conflict between such adversaries. Due to the issue of interpretation of a procedural frame, such an idea is unpersuasive and non-implementable: given the assumption of a true politically adversarial relationship, which entails a disagreement over the ways of interpreting of a common institutional frame, such a frame cannot be unambiguously legitimate or efficient. True democracy rests on a true consensus concerning the issue of interpreting and implementing of procedures, which is then, contra Mouffe, bound to take democratic mechanisms of decision-making in direction of a political friendship, or, to put it in a more neutral vocabulary, of a peaceful and discursive [hence discourse-ethical and epistemically plausible] resolution of political conflict" [which contradicts Mouffe's premise on the necessarily conflictual nature of all politics; added in 2017] (Pehar 2014b).

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SAŽETAK

DEDISKURZACIJA: ETIČKO-DISKURZIVNA KRITIKA DISKURZIVNE PROIZVODNJE STANJA RATA

Ovaj ogled nudi kratak prikaz teorije dediskurzacije kao teorije jednoga od važnih uzroka rata. Ključna tvrdnja teorije kaže da diskurzivni stavovi, kao što su laganje, proturječenje sebi, te kršenje obećanja, trebaju biti teorijski predstavljeni kao uzroci koji izravno doprinose pojavi stanja rata. Ogled također objašnjava u kojem smislu ova teorija implicira poimanje jezika kao generatora virtualnoga kolektivnog tijela. Treće, ogled se oslanja na Peloponeski rat kao empirijski dokazni materijal u prilog teorije dediskurzacije, te objašnjava razloge zbog kojih se ona ne može pomiriti sa teoretiziranjem rata u tradiciji teorija 'pravednoga rata'. Kao posljednje, ogled ističe neke etičke, epistemološke i političke implikacije kako bi se, koliko je to ovdje moguće, pojasnila šira lepeza stavova na koje se teorija dediskurzacije obvezuje.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: dediskurzacija, etika diskursa, uzroci rata, Peloponeski rat, teorija pravednog rata, republikanska politička teorija.